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Abstract 
We measure a bank’s connectedness by constructing a measure of its text similarity with other 
banks based on 10-K business description and MD&A discussions. We find that tail-risk 
comovement between a given bank and the banking system is increasing in the bank’s average 
similarity. We also construct groups of connected peer banks, finding that banks co-move 
significantly more in the tails with their highest similarity peers. Finally, we separate 10-K text 
into boilerplate and non-boilerplate components. We find that both boilerplate and non-
boilerplate similarity have incremental information about future tail comovement. However, non-
boilerplate similarity is significantly timelier than boilerplate, consistent with non-boilerplate 
similarity capturing commonalities across banks in currently evolving fundamentals and 
boilerplate similarity capturing commonalities in structural features that evolve slowly over time. 
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Introduction 
The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 focused significant attention on assessing and managing 
the downside tail-risk of banks. In addition to focusing on the standalone risks of individual 
banks, increasing attention has been focused on the complex web of direct and indirect 
interconnections between banks through which illiquidity, insolvency, and losses can spread 
during periods of financial distress. Strong interconnectivity can result in banks sharing similar 
vulnerabilities that expose them to comovement of extreme downside outcomes. In this paper, 
we investigate the extent to which similarity in verbal disclosures in 10-K reports across banks 
provides valuable information about their interconnectedness. Specifically, we examine both the 
informativeness and timeliness of a bank’s 10-K text similarity with other banks for predicting 
the bank’s future tail-risk comovement with these other banks.  
Our objective in pursuing this line of inquiry is twofold. First, we seek to provide evidence 
to bank outsiders (bank regulators, investors, researchers, etc.) about the value of text-based 
financial analysis for assessing bank connectedness and predicting future comovement in 
downside tail outcomes among connected banks. The challenges involved in constructing useful 
measures of the susceptibility of banks to systemic risk exposure has motivated a vibrant, 
growing literature which raises the possibility that multiple risk measures may be needed to 
capture the complex and adaptive nature of the financial system (e.g., Hansen, 2014; Bisias, 
2012). A common approach to measuring bank connectedness and systemic risk exposure relies 
exclusively on quantitative information such as return series of traded securities and balance 
sheet data (e.g., Billio et al., 2012; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016; Cai et al., 2016; Acharya et 
al., 2017). However, a recent literature demonstrates that verbal discussions in mandatory 
financial reports comprise a rich source of valuable information that can be extracted using 
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natural language processing techniques (e.g., Hoberg and Philips, 2016; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2016). We extend the systemic risk measurement literature by constructing measures 
of bank connectedness based on text similarity across banks’10-K business descriptions and 
MD&A discussions, and exploring their ability to predict future tail comovement across banks. 
Second, we seek to provide new insights into the decision usefulness of 10-K textual 
disclosure by applying these disclosures in a novel decision context. As noted by Gjesdal (1981) 
and Dechow et al., (2010), the usefulness of an information system can vary across decision 
contexts. This suggests that a more complete understanding of the informativeness of 10-K 
verbal disclosures requires research across a range of different settings. We contribute to this 
quest by investigating the informativeness for forecasting future tail comovement of different 
sections within the 10-K (i.e., business description, MD&A, risk factors and footnotes), and of 
boilerplate vs. non-boilerplate language. A notable feature of our paper is the use of 10-K text 
similarity across banks to isolate network clusters of banks that share similar vulnerabilities to 
downside tail risk. This contrasts with a growing literature using 10-K discussions to extract 
incremental information about the prospects of individual firms.1 Further, our exploration the 
information properties of boilerplate language similarity across banks relative to non-boilerplate 
text similarity, contributes to the debate about the consequences of increasingly onerous 
accounting disclosures (Dyer et al., 2017; Li, 2008; SEC, 2013).  
Our approach to measuring bank connectedness is related in some respects to the text-
based approach used by Hoberg and Philips (2016) to organize publicly traded firms into 
industry groupings. Applying textual analysis to the business description section of 10-K reports, 
                                                 
1 This includes findings that there is incremental information content in the tone of 10-K text (Feldman, Givindaraj, 
Livnat, and Segal, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011), in its readability (Li, 2008; Loughran and McDonald 
2014), and in year-on-year changes to the MD&A section (Brown and Tucker, 2011; Cohen, Malloy, and Nguyen, 
2015). 
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Hoberg and Philips (2016) compute measures of pairwise product similarity that reflect the 
extent to which firms are related to each other in terms of their product offerings. Unlike Hoberg 
and Philips, our objective is to construct measures of bank connectedness that capture the extent 
to which a group of banks share similar vulnerabilities to downside tail risk. Such risk 
vulnerabilities can be driven by sources of connectedness beyond product market competition, 
including key aspects of the bank’s current and forecasted situation that spans performance, 
business models, credit risk, investment concentrations, funding sources, and liquidity 
exposures, among other issues. In light of this, we expand our 10-K text analysis to consider the 
business description section (similar to Hoberg and Philips), as well as the Management 
Discussion and Analysis disclosure (MD&A).  
To measure bank connectedness using the textual discussions in the 10-K, we construct 
time-varying measures of cosine similarity between a bank’s business description and MD&A 
discussions and those of all other publicly traded banks. We then use the matrix of pairwise 
similarities to design measures of connectedness between banks and investigate the extent to 
which these connectedness measures predict future tail comovement among connected banks.  
We measure tail risk comovement using two measures designed to capture both the 
magnitude and the frequency of tail risk comovement. To capture the magnitude of comovement, 
our first measure is constructed as the average of the abnormal returns of a given bank over the 
20 days where the portfolio of banks in a chosen index group has its lowest abnormal 
performance for the year. To capture the frequency of tail risk, our second measure is the number 
of days in which a bank experiences one its 20 lowest abnormal return days at the same time that 
the portfolio of banks in a chosen index group is also experiencing one its 20 lowest return days. 
The portfolio of banks used to construct our index groups is either the entire banking sector or 
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portfolios consisting of banks designated as a bank’s peer or non-peer banks based on our text 
similarity measure of connectedness.  
We begin our analyses by first examining the relation between a bank’s average cosine 
similarity with all other publicly traded banks and its tail co-movement with an index portfolio 
consisting of all other banks. We find that comovement between the lower tail of a given bank’s 
future equity return distribution and the lower tail of the banking system’s return distribution is 
increasing in the average cosine similarity of the bank. Our results hold after controlling for the 
current level of tail comovement and a quantitative measure of connectedness constructed by 
estimating pairwise cosine similarities between all banks based on the entire, standardized vector 
of quantitative accounting data required to be reported in banks’ regulatory financial report 
filings. 
While our previous analyses considered a bank’s average text similarity and tail 
comovement with all other banks, it is likely that a bank’s connectedness and tail comovement is 
not uniform across banks. Rather, a bank’s tail comovement should be significantly higher with 
banks with which it is most similar than it is with less similar banks. To explore this possibility, 
we examine the extent to which the matrix of pairwise text similarities scores allows us to 
effectively cluster the banking sector into subsets of banks for which future tail movement is 
expected to be the highest. We find that a bank co-moves significantly more in the tails within its 
highest similarity cluster than with lower similarity banks. 
Up to now, our analyses have computed text similarity using the combined text of the 
business description and MD&A sections of banks’ 10-K reports. To examine the relative 
informativeness of different aspects of 10-K textual discussions, we compute a bank’s average 
cosine similarity score separately for the business description and MD&A sections. We find that 
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both business description similarity and MD&A similarity have incremental information for 
predicting future tail comovement. However, the economic significance of business description 
similarity is higher than MD&A similarity. While not part of our original similarity measure, in 
further analyses, we find that footnote text similarity has no incremental information relative to 
business description and MD&A text similarity. Finally, more recently firms have been required 
to disclose risk factors in a separate section. For a subset of banks, we also show that the risk 
factor section similarity does have incremental information, however, the coefficient on the risk 
factor similarity is negative, suggesting that it is useful in rebalancing the weighting across 
different dimensions of fundamentals aggregated together within business description and 
MD&A similarity. 
In addition to examining the usefulness of different sections of the 10-K for predicting tail 
risk we also investigate the information content of the type of language found in the 10-K. 
Investors, preparers, regulators, and standard setters have expressed concern that the use of 
boilerplate language in 10-K textual disclosures has been increasing over time, potentially 
reducing the usefulness of these disclosures (Li, 2008; SEC, 2013). In this regard, we separate 
our primary measure (i.e., the combined business and MD&A text) into boilerplate language and 
non-boilerplate language following the methodology from Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015) and 
Dyer et al., (2017). We then compute a separate boilerplate similarity measure and non-
boilerplate similarity measure.  
Using these new measures of similarity, we first document that boilerplate similarity across 
banks has not significantly increased in recent years. Second, we find that both boilerplate and 
non-boilerplate similarity have incremental information about future tail comovement. Finally, 
when we include three lags in each of the similarity measures (boilerplate and non-boilerplate), 
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we find that the first lag in non-boilerplate similarity is most informative, while the third lag is 
most informative for boilerplate similarity. This suggests non-boilerplate similarity is timelier 
than boilerplate, this evidence is consistent with non-boilerplate similarity capturing 
commonalities across banks in currently evolving fundamentals and boilerplate similarity 
capturing commonalities in structural features that evolve slowly over time.   
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the literature 
on systemic risk by demonstrating that similarity across banks’ 10-K textual disclosures is 
informative about future tail comovement. Our text similarity technique for organizing banks 
into high comovement groups may be useful to bank outsiders (regulators, investors, etc.) for 
extending oversight or monitoring to clusters of similarly vulnerable publicly traded banks, in 
addition to a focus on individual banks. This technique may also be valuable to outside investors 
and researchers who must rely on public information in assessing the implications of bank 
vulnerability for future tail comovement. We complement Rönnqvist and Sarlin (2016), who 
estimate interconnections between large European banks based on co-occurrences of bank names 
in news articles, and papers measuring bank connections using quantitative data ((e.g., Billio et 
al., 2012; Huang et al., 2011; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016; Acharya et al., 2016; Cai et al., 
2016). We also complement Hanley and Hoberg (2016) who use computational linguistics of 
bank's risk disclosures in the 10-K to develop an empirical model of dynamic, interpretable 
emerging risks that predicts the emergence of financial instability. 
Second, where Hoberg and Philip use similarity in product market descriptions to form 
product market industry clusters, we extend the literature by using textual similarity across banks 
to form clusters of banks based on common vulnerabilities to downside tail outcomes. Our multi-
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firm perspective on 10-K disclosures also extends a growing body of research that uses textual 
analysis to assess the implications of narrative financial disclosures at the individual firm level.2  
Finally, we contribute to the literature that examines the usefulness of textual discussions 
found in the 10-K by applying these disclosures to a multi-firm setting in a novel decision 
context. Significant increases in the length and complexity of 10-K verbal disclosures have 
prompted concerns about the usefulness and informativeness of these disclosures (KPMG, 2011; 
SEC, 2013; Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015); Dyer et al. (2017). Because the value of information 
depends on context, our extension to predicting tail comovement across banks expands the 
frontier of knowledge about the information content of 10-K disclosures. Further, our analyses of 
the informativeness of text similarity across banks for different sections of the 10-K extends the 
literature that looks at this for individual firms (e.g., Amel-Zadeh and Faasse, 2016). Also, our 
results provide evidence that while boilerplate similarity is not as timely as non-boilerplate 
similarity, boilerplate similarity still does have information content for predicting comovement 
over and above the non-boilerplate language. These results add a new perspective on boilerplate 
language by suggesting that such language reflects structural aspects of a bank that change 
slowly over time. It is also noteworthy that while the use of boilerplate language has increased 
significantly over time (Dyer et al., 2017), we find that boilerplate similarity across banks does 
not exhibit an increasing trend and the informative of such similarity for predicting future tail 
comovement has not deteriorate through time. 
Our remainder of our paper proceeds as follows, section 2 discusses the sample selection 
and measurement of connectedness. Section 3 discusses the empirical approaches we take and 
the results. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                 
2 Recent reviews of the literature include Loughran and McDonald (2016) and Kearney and Liu (2014). 
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2. Sample, Measures of Connectedness and Comovement, and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample consists of all banks with two digit historic SIC codes between 60 and 62 
which are available in Compustat Annual or Compustat Annual Bank. We download each 
financial institutions 10-K and 10-K405 filings from the SEC EDGAR online filling system. Our 
sample of 10-K filings begins in fiscal year 1996 and ends in 2012. The sample begins in fiscal 
year 1996 because this is the first year in which the SEC required all publically traded companies 
to make their filings publically available electronically through the EDGAR filing system. The 
Management Discussions and Analysis (hereafter MD&A) and Business (here after BUS) 
sections of each 10-K are extracted using PERL. Financial information was obtained from 
Compustat Annual and Compustat Annual Bank. Market returns and pricing information is 
obtained from Eventus and CRSP where needed.  In the remainder of this section, we discuss in 
detail how we measure qualitative similarity (section 2.1) and tail risk comovement (section 2.2). 
We also provide descriptive statistics for these measures (section 2.3). 
 
2.1 Text-based Measure of Connectivity 
Our initial analyses focus on cosine similarity measures of connectivity between banks 
constructed using the verbal discussion contained in the 10-K business description section (BUS) 
and the MD&A disclosures of banks’ annual 10-K reports. We will construct connectivity using 
the combined text of BUS and MD&A, as well as constructing measures for BUS and MD&A 
separately. Later in the paper we will also compute text similarity scores for the footnotes and 
risk factor disclosures from the 10-K report, as well as disaggregating the combined BUS and 
MD&A into boilerplate and non-boilerplate sentences and computing separate text similarity 
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scores for each group of sentences.3 For any given subset of 10-K verbal disclosures, we 
compute pairwise word similarity scores for each pair of banks in a given year, and then use the 
matrix of pairwise similarity scores to calculate measures of bank connectivity in a given year.  
The business description section typically appears as Item 1 or Item 1A in bank’s 10-K. 
To estimate cosine similarities, we first extract BUS and MD&A from each financial institution’s 
10-K filing for each year. As is common in the literature, stop words are eliminated from the 
text. Using the text from the combined BUS and MD&A disclosures or from BUS and MD&A 
separately, we construct a vector summarizing each bank’s usage of words. The number of 
elements in these vectors is equal to the number of unique words used by the bank. Each element 
of a vector represents the number of times that a unique word is mentioned by a bank in their 
discussion in a given year. For each year, we then estimate the pairwise cosine similarity 
between a given institution’s word vector and the word vectors of all other banks in the sample.  
Cosine similarity is a technique from the field of textual analysis which calculates the 
similarity between two sets of texts (Kogan et al 1998). The technique has had wide spread use 
in the areas of computer science and web development (Joydeep et al 2000). Recently studies in 
accounting and finance have used this technique to examine changes in firm’s fundamentals and 
similarity in product market offerings (Brown and Tucker 2011, Hoberg and Phillips 2016). The 
cosine similarity between two banks is the cosine of the angle between the vectors of words that 
comprise the combined BUS and MD&A.  Specifically, the cosine similarity between two 
vectors of words B1 and B2 is calculated as follows: 
1 2
1 2
B B
Cosine Similarity
B B

 . 
                                                 
3 We will describe our technique for defining boilerplate sentences later in the paper. 
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where ⋅ indicates vector dot product, and ||B|| is the length of vector B. B1 and B2 are the vectors 
of words for two distinct banks being compared. The axes of each vector are the unique words in 
the text and the magnitude of the axis is the number of times that the given word is mentioned in 
the given text. These word vectors in essence assign each bank a unique spatial location based on 
its word usage, and its own potential set of nearby connected banks in this space based on word 
overlaps. The distance between banks is defined by a cosine similarity score which is higher 
when banks i and j use more of the same words with similar intensity, where a cosine similarity 
of 1 means that the two word vectors are identical. This process allows us reduce high-
dimensional word vectors to a simple matrix of bank’s pairwise similarity scores.  
As discussed in more detail below, we use the matrix of pairwise cosine similarities in 
several different ways.  For some analyses, we compute the average cosine similarity between a 
given bank and all other banks in the sample in a given year using combined BUS and MD&A 
text (AvgCos_MDABUS). In Table 1 we report that AvgCos_MDABUS has a mean value of 0.70 
with a standard deviation of 0.09.  We also compute cosine similarity separately using either 
MD&A alone or BUS alone, where Table 1 reports that the mean value of AvgCos_MDA 
(AvgCos_BUS) is 0.68 (0.57) with a standard deviation of 0.09 (0.11).   
We also use pairwise cosine similarities to form each bank’s high cosine group consisting 
of the banks with which a given bank is most similar in a given year. Our premise is that this 
high cosine group represents the set of banks with which an individual bank is most connected, 
where we expect the bank to commove in the tails more with these banks than with banks outside 
the high cosine group. Our procedure for forming high cosine similarity groups of connected 
banks is similar to that used in Hoberg and Philips (2016) to place firms into industries based on 
the similarity of verbal product descriptions.  
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2.2 Tail Risk Comovement 
Following the recent financial crisis there has been considerable interest in modeling and 
measuring systemic risk, the risk that many banks will simultaneously experience financial 
distress and impose externalities on the overall economy. There is no agreed upon approach to 
this measurement (e.g., Bisias et al., 2012, Hansen, 2014). One important stream of literature 
exploits the high frequency observability of bank’s equity prices to extract measures of systemic 
risk, focusing on comovement in the tails of equity returns across banks (Acharya et al., 2017, 
Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016).  We measure tail risk comovement by constructing measures 
inspired by the marginal expected shortfall measure (MES) developed in Acharya et al. (2017).  
MES is designed to measure an individual bank’s tail risk exposure to system-wide distress, and 
is analogous to the stress tests performed by individual institutions and regulators. It has been 
shown to have significant explanatory power for which firms contribute to a potential crisis 
(Acharya et al., 2017). The MES measure reflects the connection between a bank’s equity returns 
and market equity returns on days where the market return is in the bottom 5% for the year. That 
is, it measures the extent to which an individual bank’s returns are low when the overall 
(banking) market returns are low. Building on this idea, we create two measures of tail 
comovement that aim to capture the ideas of frequency and magnitude. 
To capture frequency, our first measure, LFM Days, reflects the number of days in year t 
where bank i and a portfolio of banks included in a specified index group simultaneously 
experience low returns performance. An extreme low performance day occurs if it is in the set of 
the lowest 20 return days for year t based upon daily abnormal returns. A bank’s daily abnormal 
return is calculated using Eventus, and is the difference between the bank’s return and a value 
weighted market return. Eventus calculates the value weighted market return using NYSE, 
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AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks. We calculate a daily market return by summing the abnormal returns 
each day for all the banks in a specific portfolio of banks selected to represent the comparison 
index group, and then find the lowest 20 market performance days in a calendar year. Next, for 
each bank we calculate daily abnormal returns and then find their bottom 20 performance days in 
a given year. LFM Days is the number days in a given calendar year in which the bank and the 
selected bank index group both have low performance. This measure can vary from 0 (no overlap 
of low days for bank i and the index) and 20 (the low return days of bank i and the index 
perfectly overlap).  Depending on the specific analysis, the portfolio of banks in the index group 
will be comprised of either all banks in the sample (excluding bank i), or a bank’s high cosine 
group formed on the basis of high cosine similarity with bank i (highly connected peers). Table 1 
shows that the mean value for LFM Days when the index is defined as all banks in the sample 
(excluding bank i) is 4.12 with a standard deviation of 2.36.  This measure varies from 1 at the 
5th percentile to 9 days at the 95th percentile. 
To capture the magnitude dimension of tail-risk, our second measure, LM AbnRet, is 
measured as the average of the abnormal returns of bank i over the 20 days where the portfolio of 
banks in the index group has it lowest performance for the year. Table 1 shows that the mean 
value for LF AbnRet when the index is defined as all banks in the sample (excluding bank i) is 
0.01, with a standard deviation of 0.01. 
   
2.3 Univariate Correlations 
 In Table 2 we report univariate correlations between our main variables of interest.  
While our main qualitative connectedness measure of interest is AvgCos_MDABUS, we see that 
this measure has Pearson correlation with AvgCos_MDA of 0.84 and with AvgCos_BUS of 0.86.  
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AvgCos_MDA and AvgCos_BUS have a Pearson correlation of 0.65, implying that each measure 
contains orthogonal information.  
 In terms of tail comovement, Table 2 reports that AvgCos_MDABUS has a Pearson 
correlation with LFM Days of 0.16.  This implies that banks with higher qualitative 
connectedness are more likely than less connected banks to have low returns days at the same 
time that all other banks as a group are also experiencing low returns.  Similarly, 
AvgCos_MDABUS has a Pearson correlation with LF AbnRet of -0.15, implying that banks with 
higher qualitative connectedness have lower average abnormal returns than less connected banks 
on days when the banking sector as a whole is experiencing low returns.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
In this section, we discuss the main empirical results of our analyses of relations between 
our text-based bank connectedness measures and tail comovement across banks. The section is 
organized as follows. We begin our analyses by examining the relations between tail 
comovement and bank connectedness measures computed using the combined text of BUS and 
MD&A Section. In Section 3.1 we measure connectedness using a bank’s average cosine 
similarity with all other banks and its comovement with all other banks, while in Section 3.2 we 
construct each bank’s high cosine group and then examine whether a bank exhibits more future 
tail comovement with banks in its high cosine banks than with less connected banks. Section 3.3 
uses a contagion framework (e.g., Boyson et al., 2010) to examine whether a bank’s poor 
performance days are associated with a higher proportion of banks in its high cosine group also 
experiencing poor performance days than the proportion of banks with less connectedness. In 
section 3.4 we examine the incremental informativeness for predicting future tail comovement of 
connectedness measures computed separately for BUS, MD&A, risk factor disclosures and 
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footnote disclosures.  Finally, in Section 3.5 we disaggregate combined BUS and MD&A into 
boilerplate and non-boilerplate sentences and examine the incremental informativeness and 
timeliness of cosine similarity measures computed separately for each group of sentences. 
 
3.1 Average Cosine Analyses Using Combined BUS and MD&A Discussions 
In this section, we focus on banks’ text-based connectedness measured as a bank’s 
average cosine similarity with all other banks in the market. We examine relations between this 
connectedness measure and future tail comovement with all other banks, Specifically, we 
estimate the following multivariate OLS regression:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠_𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛽3𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                              (1) 
where the RiskMeasurei,t variable is defined as either LFM Daysi,t or LM AbnReti,t to proxy for 
tail comovement. The coefficient 𝛽1 captures the extent to which a bank’s average text-based 
cosine similarity with all other banks in the market is associated with a bank’s susceptibility to 
future tail comovement. We control for bank size (Sizei,t) measured as the log of total assets, the 
bank’s general return correlation with the banking sector (Betai,t), and the lagged RiskMeasurei,t-1 
(LFM Daysi,t-1 and LM AbnReti,t-1). We also include year fixed effects and cluster standard errors 
by both bank and year. Detailed descriptions of all variables are contained in the Appendix.  
 The results from the estimation of (1) are reported in Table 3. In Table 3, columns 1 and 
3 report the results for both LFM Days and LM AbnRet respectively. We see in column 1 that the 
coefficient on AvgCos_BUSMDA is 3.76 and is significant at the 0.01 level. This result suggests 
that the higher the average similarity of a bank’s business and MD&A discussion to all other 
banks’ discussion in a given year, the more susceptible the bank is to systemic risk. This result is 
15 
 
economically significant, where a one standard deviation increase in AvgCos_BUSMDA results 
in an 8.4% increase in the number of days that bank i and the banking market overlap in their 
lowest return days.  
In column 3 we report the result of estimating equation (1) using LM AbnRet as the risk 
measure. Because LM AbnRet is a returns-based measure of poor performance, negative 
coefficients on our measures of connectedness are consistent with greater future tail 
comovement. Similar to the results in column 1, we find that our qualitative measure of 
similarity, AvgCos_ BUSMDA, is statistically significantly negative. The results in column 3 
suggest that for a one standard deviation increase in our qualitative measure AvgCos_ BUSMDA 
there is a 16.6% reduction in the bank’s average abnormal return over the banking market’s 
lowest return days. 
Robustness - Controlling Accounting-Based Quantitative Measure of Connectivity 
One potential concern is that our text-based measure might only be capturing what is 
already found in the quantitative accounting numbers found in the regulatory filings. To allay 
this concern, we construct a novel measure of banks’ quantitative similarity by estimating 
pairwise cosine similarity between banks based on the entire, standardized vector of quantitative 
accounting data required to be reported in banks’ mandated regulatory filings. Commercial banks 
subject to the FDIC prepare regulatory filings using a reporting template required by bank 
regulators.  This regulated template structure allows us to construct vectors of accounting data 
for each bank based on the same standardized set of required reporting fields. Specifically, we 
calculate cosine similarities using financial institutions mandatory call report filings or FR Y-9C 
filings as appropriate, which have identical reporting fields (but different call letters). A 
complete set of call reports is obtained from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
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Council for the year 2001 to 2016. 4  Call reports for the years 1994 to 2000 are obtained from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.5 FR Y-9C reports were obtained from the datasets 
provided by the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank.6  
To ensure consistency across all banks’ regulatory reports, we prepare the quantitative data in the 
call reports and FR Y-9C filings by first aggregating sub-series variables to create main-series 
variables by summing the respective sub-series variables when necessary.7 This allows us to 
create variables which are comparable across reports. A firm’s quantitative information is then 
represented as a vector where the axis is the specific quantitative variable and the magnitude of 
the axis is its reported value. We then calculate the cosine similarity between each banks’ 
quantitative information vector and those of all others banks in the same calendar year. This 
measure allows us to assess the similarity across the entire set of quantitative measures reported 
by banks in their regulatory reports (AvgCos_Report). While not tabulated, the average 
quantitative cosine similarity between a given bank and all other banks in the sample in a given 
year, AvgCos_Report, has a mean value of 0.72 with a standard deviation of 0.18. Also, 
AvgCos_BUSMDA has Pearson correlation with AvgCos_Report of only 0.29, suggesting that 
there is substantial scope for our qualitative connectedness measure to contain incremental 
information about tail comovement relative to quantitative similarity.  
After computing the AvgCos_Report we have a sample of 5,499 bank years. This is 
smaller than those used for our qualitative connectedness measures because we require financial 
                                                 
4 https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/PWS/DownloadBulkData.aspx . 
5 https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/commercial-bank-data . 
6 https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/bhc-data . 
7 Main series variables are the sum of certain sub series variables. Some banks gave main series variables while 
others provide the sub series variables underlying the main series variables. For a description of the main and sub 
series variables see https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/mdrm/series . 
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institutions to have a regulatory report. We then re-estimate equation (1) for both LFM_Days and 
LM_AbnRet and report the result in columns (2) and (4) respectively. 
 In column 2 we find when both AvgCos_BUSMDA and AvgCos_Report are included, 
AvgCos_Report has a reported coefficient of 0.76 and it is statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. However, the results in column (2) show that our qualitative measure AvgCos_BUSMDA 
still remains statistically significant, although the economic significance of the 
AvgCos_BUSMDA drops from about 8.4% to a 4.4% increase in the number of days that bank i 
and the banking market overlap in their lowest return days. In column 4 we find similar results as 
that found in column 2. Specifically we see that while AvgCos_Report is negative and 
statistically significant, AvgCos_BUSMDA remains negative and statistically significant.   
 The results in Table 3 show that our qualitative connectedness measure based off the 
bank’s discussion in the business section and MD&A section of the 10-K is significantly 
associated with a bank’s future tail comovement with other banks. However, while these 
analyses considered a bank’s average text similarity and tail comovement with all other banks, it 
is likely that a bank’s connectedness and tail comovement is not uniform across banks. Rather, a 
bank’s tail comovement should be significantly higher with banks with which it is most similar 
than it is with less similar banks. To explore this possibility, in the next section we examine the 
extent to which the matrix of pairwise text similarities scores allows us to effectively cluster the 
banking sector into subsets of banks for which future tail movement is expected to be the 
highest. 
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3.2 Group Cosine Analysis 
A benefit of our methodology in computing similarity is that it allows us to refine our 
definition of bank connectedness to focus on subgroups within the market that share significant 
similarities. We use this subgroup analysis to explore the possibility that text similarity can 
identify groups of banks that are particularly susceptible to tail comovement.  
We construct a high cosine subgroup for each bank by matching it to other banks with 
which it is most similar in a given year based on cosine similarity scores. We include bank j in 
bank i’s high cosine similarity group if their text similarity score is above certain cutoff 
percentiles of the distribution of bank i’s similarity scores across all other banks. The percentiles 
that we use are 5%, 10%, 25%, and 50% of the qualitative similarity score distribution. A 5% 
cutoff selects the 5% of all other banks with which a given bank is most similar. We repeat this 
process each calendar year and so allow these groups to evolve dynamically over time. Note that 
this implies that in a given year, each bank will have the same number of banks in its high cosine 
group. An interesting property of such classification is that for each individual bank, the group of 
banks that are in close proximity in similarity need not be the same. For example, suppose that 
for Bank A the banks in the market with which it is most similar are Bank B and Bank C. 
However, it is possible that for Bank B the two most similar banks in the market are Bank X and 
Bank Z. 
It is also possible that the banks in close proximity to a given bank change over time as 
strategies and circumstances evolve.  We develop some descriptive statistics to examine the 
dynamic evolution of peer groups through time.  For each bank, in each year we construct a 
vector that reflects the banks in its peer group that year.  The number of elements in these vectors 
is equal to the number of banks minus 1 (to exclude the bank around which the peer group is 
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built).  Then for each bank, we compute the cosine similarity between the vectors for year t and 
t+1.  This cosine similarity score provides information on how similar the peer groups are across 
years. We compute this for every bank in a year and compute the average cosine similarity 
across banks for the year.  We plot the results in Figure 1. While there is evidence of some 
persistence, there is also evidence of significant change over time in the banks comprising peer 
groups. If we use 5% (50%) as cutoffs to determine high cosine groups, there is an average 
change of approximately 50% (20%) in the banks comprising peer groups.   
Our first test examines the difference in future tail comovement between a bank and the 
group of banks in its high cosine group. We conjecture that a bank will exhibit more tail 
comovement with those banks with which it has high cosine similarity than with other banks of 
lower similarity. We run the following multi-variate regression: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡,(𝐻𝐶𝐺 𝑖,𝑡−1)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
(2) 
where High Cosine Groupi,t-1 is an indicator set to 1 if the risk measure is calculated using the 
group of banks which have a high cosine similarity with the given bank, 0 if otherwise. All other 
variables are defined above, except that we now include a bank fixed effect and the portfolio of 
banks now used to compute the risk measures LFM Daysi,t,(HCG i,t-1) and LM AbnReti,t,(HCG i,t-1) are 
either those banks in a bank’s high cosine similarity subgroup or all the banks not in that 
subgroup.  That is, in a given year there are two future comovement measures computed for each 
bank, one using its high cosine group and one using the banks not in this group. In equation (2) 
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our interest is in the sign and significance of 𝛽1, the coefficient on the high cosine group 
indicator (High Cosine Group). This coefficient captures the difference in future tail 
comovement between banks for a bank’s high cosine group relative to banks with lower 
connectedness. When we use the LFM Daysi,t,(HCG i,t-1)  (LM AbnRet i,t,(HCG i,t-1)) we expect a 
positive (negative) coefficient 𝛽1.  
The results for the estimation of (2) are reported in Table 4 panels A and B. As reported, 
the results in both panels are consistent with our predictions, with the coefficient on LFM 
Daysi,t,(HCG i,t-1) (LM AbnReti,t,(HCG i,t-1)) being positive (negative) and significant for all four high 
cosine cutoff thresholds.  Interestingly, in both panels A and B we see that the absolute value of 
the coefficient monotonically decreases as we move from more the exclusive 5% cutoff to the 
less exclusive 50% cutoff. For example, in panel A we that LFM Daysi,t,(HCG i,t-1) is 1.3 days 
higher for banks in the 5% high similarity group, where it is only 0.27 days higher in the 50% 
similarity group. Note that 1.3 days is a very large increase when compared to the unconditional 
mean for LFM Days of 4.16 days reported in Table 1. Similarly, the economic effects in panel B 
suggest for the 5% high similarity group there is a -0.0065 decrease in the return or a 54% 
reduction.    
 These results provide evidence that our text-based connectedness measure is able to 
identify subgroups within a bank that are more likely in the future to commove in the tails. 
 
3.3 Examining Connectedness and Tail Comovement in a Contagion Framework 
So far, our analyses of text-based connectedness examine the extent to which the returns 
of a bank are low when conditioning on whether similar banks are experiencing low returns. We 
now turn this around and examine whether the returns of the group of banks with which an 
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individual bank is similar are low when conditioning on the individual bank’s returns being low. 
While this approach is clearly related to our previous analyses, it further allows us to consider 
how comprehensive the tail comovement effect across connected bank peers by examining the 
proportion of banks in a bank’s high cosine group that are having a low return day when the bank 
is having a low return day. Our analysis builds on framework used in the Boyson et al. (2010) 
analysis of hedge fund contagion.  Specifically, we estimate the following models by high and 
low cosine group for each bank: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡,(𝐻𝐶𝐺 𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1𝑥 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝜖                  (3)    
 
where Proportion Lowi,t,(HCG i,t-1) is the proportion of banks in a given bank’s subgroup on day t 
that are have a low performance day. Recall, these subgroups are either banks in a given bank’s 
high cosine group or banks outside this group. Low Day is an indicator variable set to 1 for bank 
i on day t if its daily abnormal return is in the bottom 5% of the entire set of its daily returns, and 
zero otherwise. We then interact Low Day with High Cosine Groupi,t-1 which is an indicator set 
to 1 if the dependent variable is calculated using the group of banks which have a high cosine 
similarity with the given bank, and 0 if otherwise. We predict that the coefficient on the 
interaction Low Day x High Cosine Groupi,t-1 will be positive, consistent with the proportion of 
banks also experiencing a low return when bank i is experiencing a low return day being 
relatively higher for banks within its high cosine similarity subgroup.  
We estimate equation (3) and report the results in Table 5. Similar to Table 4, we again 
present the results for different group similarity cutoffs (i.e., 5%, 10%, 25%, and 50%). As 
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predicted, the coefficient on the interaction Low Day x High Cosine Groupi,t-1 is positive and 
significant for all four similarity cutoffs.  
 
3.4 Relative Informativeness of Different Aspects of 10-K Text 
While we have up to now used the combined text the BUS and MD&A sections of the 
10-K report, it is possible that the informativeness of text similarity measures may vary across 
distinct segments of the 10-K. We explore this possibility by examining the incremental 
informativeness for predicting future tail comovement of connectedness measures computed 
separately for BUS, MD&A, risk factor disclosures and footnote disclosures.   
Before looking at the multivariate results, Figure 2 plots over our sample period the 
average of both AvgCos_BUS and AvgCos_MDA. From the graph it is evident that over the 
sample period AvgCos_BUS as remained much flatter compared to AvgCos_MDA. To examine 
the information content of these measures, Table 6 reports the results of considering separate 
average cosine text similarity measures for BUS (AvgCos_BUS) and MD&A (AvgCos_MDA).  
Columns 1-3 report results when comovement is measured by LFM Days and columns 3-6 for 
LM AbnRet. We see in Table 6 that for LFM Days (LM AbnRet), the coefficients on 
AvgCos_BUS and AvgCos_MDA are both positive (negative) and significantly different from 
zero (p<.01) when included separately, and that each has significant incremental informativeness 
when they are included simultaneously. However, the economic significance of business 
description similarity is higher than MD&A similarity. For LFM Days (LM AbnRet), a one 
standard deviation increase in BUS similarity results in a 6% (11%) increase in future tail 
comovement, while for MD&A similarity there is only a 2.5% (3%) increase. 
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We next consider the incremental informativeness for predicting future tail comovement 
contained in the text similarity of financial statement footnotes across banks. For each bank, we 
compute average cosine similarity based on the text in the footnotes, AvgCos_Notes.  In Table 7, 
we see that AvgCos_Notes is significantly associated with future tail comovement when included 
alone. However, when we also include AvgCos_BUSMDA in addition to AvgCos_Notes, Table 7 
shows that while AvgCos_BUSMDA continues to be significantly associated with future tail 
comovement, AvgCos_Notes has no incremental informativeness relative to the information 
contained in AvgCos_BUSMDA.  
Finally, we also consider the incremental informativeness contained in the text similarity 
of required 10-K risk factor disclosures across banks. The SEC only required these disclosures 
after 2005, and so our sample size is significantly smaller (approximately half of the original 
sample size) for this analysis. For each bank, we compute average cosine similarity based on the 
text in the risk factor disclosure section of the 10-K, AvgCos_Risk.  In Table 7, we see that 
AvgCos_Risk is significantly associated with future tail comovement when included alone. When 
we also include AvgCos_BUSMDA in addition to AvgCos_Risk, Table 7 shows that 
AvgCos_BUSMDA still has incremental information over and above AvgCos_Risk about future 
tail comovement. However, note that the coefficient on AvgCos_Risk in columns 4 and 5 is 
negative, suggesting that it is useful in rebalancing the weighting across different dimensions of 
fundamentals aggregated together within business description and MD&A similarity. 
 
3.5 Relative Information Content of Boilerplate and Non-Boilerplate Language  
The previous section provides evidence on the information content of similarities in 
different defined sections of the 10-K. In this section, we shift our focus from the information 
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content in similarity within a section of the 10-K to understanding similarities in the nature of the 
language used in the 10-K. Specifically, we are interested in understanding more about the 
information content of similarities in boilerplate and non-boilerplate language for understanding 
future tail risk.  
We begin by separating our primary measure, AvgCos_BUSMDA, into boilerplate and 
non-boilerplate similarity following the methodology from Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015) and 
Dyer et al., (2017). Specifically, a sentence is designated as boilerplate if it contains a 4-word 
phrase which appears in more than 60% of the BUS or MD&A disclosures of all banks in a given 
year. Stop words are not included in the 4-word phrases. We then compute a separate average 
similarity measure for all boilerplate sentences found in the business section and MD&A, termed 
AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate. All other sentences in a bank’s business and MD&A sections 
that are not boilerplate are classified as non-boilerplate sentences. Taking the non-boilerplate 
sentences we again construct a cosine similarity measure and term it 
AvgCos_BUSMDA_NonBoilerplate.  
In figure 3, we plot the annual average across all banks of the average cosine similarity of 
boilerplate and non-boilerplate sentences from 1997 to 2014. The figure shows that non-
boilerplate similarity has steadily, but slowly increased over time.  In contrast, we see that while 
boilerplate similarity increased between 1997 and 2004, since 2004 it has very slowly decreased.  
Thus, while Dyer et al. (2017) show that in recent years the extent of boilerplate language has 
increased significantly, in banking we do not see this increase in the use of boilerplate language 
translating into higher boilerplate similarity across banks. 
In Table 8, we report the results of including average boilerplate and non-boilerplate 
similarity as separate variables. When comovement is measured by either LFM Days or LM 
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AbnRet, both average boilerplate and non-boilerplate similarity are seen to have incremental 
information content. However, the economic significance of non-boilerplate similarity is higher 
than boilerplate similarity. For LFM Days (LM AbnRet), a one standard deviation increase in 
non-boilerplate similarity results in a 7.5% (12.7%) increase in future tail comovement, while for 
boilerplate similarity there is only a 1.6% (2%) increase. 
Timeliness of Boilerplate and Non-Boilerplate Language 
Given the results in table 8, we next investigate the timing aspects of boilerplate vs non-
boilerplate information. From Figure 3 we can see that at the aggregate level there is lower 
variation in the boilerplate similarity compared to non-boilerplate. Given similarity in boilerplate 
discussions has information content but little variability over time, it may be possible that the 
nature of the boilerplate discussions is different and potentially capture the underlying structural 
fundamentals of the bank. This would potentially make non-boilerplate discussion timelier. 
In table 9, we explore the possibility that non-boilerplate similarity is timelier than 
boilerplate similarity. Specifically, we include 3 lags of non-boilerplate and boilerplate 
similarity. The results show only the third lag (t-3) of boilerplate similarity is significantly 
associated with tail comovement at time t. For LFM Days (LM AbnRet), a one standard deviation 
increase in boilerplate similarity at t-3 results in a 2.6% (3.5%) increase in future tail 
comovement. In contrast, for non-boilerplate similarity the coefficient on first lag (t-1) loads 
significantly (the second lag also loads for LFM Days), while the third lag does not load 
significantly. These results suggest that non-boilerplate similarity is timelier than boilerplate, 
consistent with non-boilerplate similarity capturing commonalities across banks in currently 
evolving fundamentals and boilerplate similarity capturing commonalities in structural features 
that evolve slowly over time.   
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Dyer et al. (2017) documents a significant increase in boilerplate language in recent 
years. While we have not seen an increase in average boilerplate similarity through time, as a 
final analysis we perform an exploratory analysis examining whether the information content of 
boilerplate similarity has increased or decreased over time. To examine this question, we interact 
non-boilerplate and boilerplate similarity with an indicator variable, Post-2006, which is set 
equal to 1 for years after 2006, and 0 otherwise. While the average boilerplate similarity has not 
increased over time, the documented increase found in Dyer et al. may result in less information 
content in the similarity measure. If the information content was different through time, this 
would lead us to predict a moderating effect on the interaction term. 
The results from our analysis are reported in table 10. We find no evidence that the 
informativeness of boilerplate language has changed in recent years. Both of the interaction 
terms are statistically insignificant. Interestingly, we do see that the coefficient on non-
boilerplate similarity has significantly increased post 2006. These results suggest that while the 
information content of boilerplate language has remained constant despite the increased use of 
boilerplate language per Dyer et al., the information content of the non-boilerplate language has 
increased over time. 
 
Summary 
In this paper we examine the informativeness and timeliness of a bank’s 10-K discussions 
for predicting its future downside tail risk comovement with other banks. Our objective is 
twofold. First, we seek to provide evidence to bank outsiders (bank regulators, investors, 
researchers, etc.) about the value of incorporating text-based financial analysis into assessments 
of bank connectedness and related systemic risk exposures. Second, in addition to extending the 
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risk measurement literature we seek to provide new insights into the usefulness of 10-K textual 
disclosure by applying these disclosures in a novel decision context, the prediction of future tail 
comovement among banks.  
To measure connectedness, we construct time-varying measures of cosine similarity 
between a bank’s business description and MD&A discussions and those of all other publicly 
traded banks. We then use the matrix of pairwise similarities to design measures of 
connectedness between banks and investigate the extent to which these connectedness measures 
predict future tail comovement among connected banks.  
Focusing first on average similarity of a bank’s textual disclosures with those of all other 
banks, we find that comovement between the lower tail of a given bank’s future equity return 
distribution and the lower tail of the banking system’s returns is increasing in the bank’s average 
similarity. While this analysis considers a bank’s average text similarity, it is plausible that a 
bank’s connectedness and tail comovement is not uniform across banks. Rather, a bank’s tail 
comovement should be significantly higher with banks with which it is most similar than it is 
with less similar banks. To explore this possibility, we construct groups of connected peer banks 
with the most text similarity, finding that banks co-move significantly more in the tails with its 
highest similarity peers than with lower similarity banks.  
To examine the relative informativeness of different aspects of 10-K textual discussions, 
we disaggregate similarity into business description and MD&A components finding that, while 
both predict future tail comovement, the economic significance of business description similarity 
is much higher than MD&A similarity. Further, footnote text similarity has no incremental 
explanatory power relative to business description and MD&A text similarity. We also show that 
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business description and MD&A similarity and risk factor disclosure both have incremental 
information.  
Finally, we separate 10-K text into boilerplate and non-boilerplate components. We 
document that boilerplate similarity across banks has not significantly increased in recent years, 
and that both boilerplate and non-boilerplate similarity have incremental information about 
future tail comovement. However, non-boilerplate similarity is significantly timelier than 
boilerplate similarity. 
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Variable Description
AvgCos_BUSMDA i,t Average of the cosine similarity of the combined Item 7 MD&A and Item
1 Business Section between financial institution i and all other financial
institutions filed in year t.
AvgCos_MDA(BUS)(Risk)(Notes) i,t Average of the cosine similarity of Item 7 MD&A (Item 1 Business
Section ) (Item 1A Risk Factors) (Notes to the Financial Statements)
between financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in
year t-1.
AvgCos_BUSMDA_(Non)Boilerplate i,t Average of the cosine similarity of the boilerplate (non-boilerplate)
sentences in the Item 1Business Section and Item 7 MD&A between
financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in year t. A
sentence is marked as boilerplate if it contains a tetragram which appears
in more than 60% of all financial institutions Business Section or MD&A
disclosures in the given year. Stopwords are not included in the
tetragrams.
AvgCos_Report i,t Average of the cosine similarity of the items in the Y-9C or Call Report
between financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in
year t-1.
LFM Days i,t,(HCG i,t) The number of days in year t where bank i and banks in the group
(HCGi,t) both have low returns performance. A low performance day is
the lowest 20 days based upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the sum
of the value weighted abnormal returns is used for the group). HCGi,t 
(High Cosine Group) is defined below.
LM AbnRet i,t,(HCG i,t) The average abnormal returns of bank i on days when the group (HCGi,t ) 
has low performance. A low performance day is the lowest 20 days based
upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the sum of the value weighted
abnormal returns is used for the group). HCGi,t (High Cosine Group) is
defined below.
Size i,t Log of total assets for financial institution i in year t.
Beta i,t Market Beta measured using the market model and a rolling three year
window of returns.
High Cosine Group i,t An indicator set to 1 if the given observation is computed using banks in
the high cosine group, 0 otherwise. Banks in the high cosine group are
chosen based upon their cosine similarity with firm i (see High(Low)
Cosine Group Cutoff).
Low Day i,t An indicator set to 1 for financial institution i on day t if its daily
abnormal return is in the bottom 5% of all of its daily returns in our
sample
Prop. Low i,t,(HCG i,t) The proportion of firms in the group (HCGi,t) for firm i on day t which
have low performance (i.e. Low Dayi,t = 1). HCGi,t is an indicator which
denotes if the group is the high cosine group. High cosine group is
defined as above.
High(Low) Cosine Group Cutoff High(Low) Cosine Group Cutoff denotes the cutoff for high (low) cosine
similarity. For example 5% means that a pair of financial institutions have
high cosine similarity if their cosine similarity is above the 5th percentile
of the cosine distribution.
Appendix 1
Variables and Grouping Descriptions
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Variable N Mean P5 P25 Median P75 P95 σ 
AvgCos_BUSMDA i,t 8,784 0.694 0.485 0.659 0.727 0.759 0.787 0.093
AvgCos_BUS i,t 8,307 0.600 0.341 0.558 0.642 0.683 0.716 0.116
AvgCos_MDA i,t 8,782 0.682 0.499 0.646 0.710 0.745 0.774 0.087
LFM Days i,t 8,903 4.164 1.000 2.000 4.000 6.000 9.000 2.443
LM AbnRet i,t 8,747 -0.012 -0.031 -0.018 -0.010 -0.005 0.002 0.011
Size i,t 8,785 7.294 5.355 6.276 7.004 8.047 10.265 1.524
Beta i,t 8,783 0.626 0.008 0.164 0.459 1.049 1.639 0.542
Table 1
Summary Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our study.
AvgCos_BUSMDAi,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the combined MD&A (Item 7) and Business Section
(Item 1) between financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in year t-1. AvgCos_BUSi,t is the
average of the cosine similarity of the Business Section (Item 1) between financial institution i and all other
financial institutions filed in year t-1. AvgCos_MDAi,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the MD&A (Item 7)
between financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in year t-1. LFM Daysi,t is the number of
days in year t where bank i and the banking market both have low performance. A low performance day is the
lowest 20 days based upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the sum of the value weighted abnormal returns is used
for the market). LM AbnReti, t The average abnormal returns of bank i over days where the banking market has low
performance. A low performance day is defined the same as above. Sizei, t is the log total assets for financial
institution i in year t. Betai,t is market Beta for financial institution i in year t measured using the market model and
a rolling three year window of returns.
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Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AvgCos_BUSMDA i,t 1 - 0.75 0.85 0.11 -0.08 0.00 -0.20
AvgCos_BUS i,t 2 0.84 - 0.56 0.15 -0.13 -0.04 -0.26
AvgCos_MDA i,t 3 0.86 0.65 - 0.09 -0.08 0.05 -0.15
LFM Days i,t 4 0.16 0.19 0.13 - -0.63 0.03 -0.09
LM AbnRet i,t 5 -0.15 -0.17 -0.13 -0.55 - 0.17 0.21
Size i,t 6 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.16 - 0.64
Beta i,t 7 -0.26 -0.31 -0.19 -0.12 0.19 0.57 -
Table 2
Pearson and Spearman Pair-Wise Correlations
This table presents the pair-wise pearson (below diagonal) and spearman correlations (above diagonal) of the
main variables used in our study.
AvgCos_BUSMDAi,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the combined MD&A (Item 7) and Business
Section (Item 1) between financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in year t-1.
AvgCos_BUSi,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the Business Section (Item 1) between financial
institution i and all other financial institutions filed in year t-1. AvgCos_MDAi,t is the average of the cosine
similarity of the MD&A (Item 7) between financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in year
t-1. LFM Daysi,t is the number of days in year t where bank i and the banking market both have low
performance. A low performance day is the lowest 20 days based upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the
sum of the value weighted abnormal returns is used for the market). LM AbnReti,t The average abnormal returns
of bank i over days where the banking market has low performance. A low performance day is defined the
same as above. Sizei,t is the log total assets for financial institution i in year t. Betai,t is market Beta for financial
institution i in year t measured using the market model and a rolling three year window of returns.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable LFM Days i,t LFM Days i,t LM AbnRet i,t LM AbnRet i,t
AvgCos_BUSMDA i,t-1 3.7572*** 1.9488*** -0.0178*** -0.0089***
(6.65) (3.60) (-5.24) (-3.09)
AvgCos_Report i,t-1 0.7613*** -0.0026**
(2.72) (-2.44)
Size i,t-1 0.0034 0.0100 0.0008** 0.0010**
(0.05) (0.10) (2.50) (2.16)
Beta i,t-1 0.2453 0.5730* -0.0003 -0.0016
(0.94) (1.89) (-0.21) (-0.73)
LFM Days i,t-1 0.2899*** 0.2596***
(5.87) (5.12)
LM AbnRet i,t-1 0.1640** 0.1030
(2.50) (1.31)
Constant 0.2984 0.8255 -0.0046 -0.0104***
(0.51) (0.95) (-1.51) (-2.66)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year
Cluster Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Observations 8,370 5,334 8,189 5,280
Adjusted R-Squared 0.258 0.244 0.308 0.323
Regression of Downside Tail Risk Comovement on Banks Average Cosine
Table 3
This table presents the regression of downside tail risk comovement measures on the average cosine of the
Business Section and MD&A of financial institutions.
LFM Daysi,t is the number of days in year t where bank i and the banking market both have low
performance. A low performance day is the lowest 20 days based upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the
sum of the value weighted abnormal returns is used for the market). LM AbnReti,t the average abnormal
returns of bank i over days where the banking market has low performance. A low performance day is
defined the same as above. AvgCos_BUSMDAi,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the combined
MD&A (Item 7) and Business Section (Item 1) between financial institution i and all other financial
institutions filed in year t. AvgCos_Reporti,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the items in the Y-9C or
Call Report between financial instituion i and all other financial institutions filed in year t. Sizei,t is the log
total assets for financial institution i in year t. Betai,t is market Beta for financial institution i in year t
measured using the market model and a rolling three year window of returns.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cutoff = 5% Cutoff = 10% Cutoff = 25% Cutoff = 50%
Variable LFM Days i,t,(HCG i,t-1) LFM Days i,t,(HCG i,t-1) LFM Days i,t,(HCG i,t-1) LFM Days i,t,(HCG i,t-1)
High Cosine Group i,t-1 1.3156*** 1.1111*** 0.6077*** 0.2713***
(7.70) (5.69) (4.53) (3.50)
LFM Days i,t-1,(HCG i,t-1) 0.1701*** 0.2010*** 0.2056*** 0.1386***
(5.82) (8.85) (7.59) (5.09)
Size i,t-1 0.1486*** 0.0966* 0.1917*** 0.1744**
(2.84) (1.77) (2.89) (2.16)
Beta i,t-1 0.3741* 0.4280** 0.5399** 0.5740**
(1.93) (2.02) (2.15) (2.02)
Constant 1.4110*** 1.9058*** 1.7953*** 2.5604***
(3.64) (4.98) (4.24) (4.44)
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Cluster Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Observations 15,196 15,163 15,171 15,189
Adjusted R-Squared 0.293 0.302 0.322 0.370
Table 4
Downside Tail Risk Comovement in High and Low Cosine Groups
Panel A - Overlap in Bank and Market Low Performance Days
This table presents the difference in downside tail risk comovement of a financial institution in relation to financial institutions with which it shares a high
and low cosine similarity. High/Low Cosine Group Cutoff Percentage (Cutoff) denotes the cutoff for high/low cosine similarity. For example 5% means a
pair of financial institutions have high cosine similarity if their cosine similarity is above the 5th percentile of the cosine distribution.
LFM Daysi,t,(HCG i,t-1) is the number of days in year t where financial institution i and the financial institutions in the group (HCG i,t) both have low returns
performance. A low performance day is the lowest 20 days based upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the sum of the abnormal returns is used for the
group). LM AbnReti,t the average of the abnormal returns of financial institution i over the days where the group (HCG i,t) has low performance. A low
performance day is defined the same as above. High Cosine Groupi,t is a flag set to 1 if LFM Days (LM AbnRet) is calculated using banks in the high cosine
group, 0 otherwise. Sizei,t is the log total assets for financial institution i in year t. Betai,t is market Beta for financial institution i in year t measured using the
market model and a rolling three year window of returns.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cutoff = 5% Cutoff = 10% Cutoff = 25% Cutoff = 50%
Variable LM AbnRet i,t,(HCG i,t-1) LM AbnRet i,t,(HCG i,t-1) LM AbnRet i,t,(HCG i,t-1) LM AbnRet i,t,(HCG i,t-1)
High Cosine Group i,t-1 -0.0065*** -0.0056*** -0.0036*** -0.0021***
(-7.12) (-7.96) (-6.47) (-4.34)
LM AbnRet i,t-1,(HCG i,t-1) 0.2055*** 0.2561*** 0.2960*** 0.1764***
(4.37) (4.27) (4.27) (3.87)
Size i,t-1 -0.0009** -0.0013*** -0.0017*** -0.0017***
(-2.15) (-2.90) (-3.64) (-3.39)
Beta i,t-1 -0.0022* -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023
(-1.66) (-1.47) (-1.25) (-1.11)
Constant 0.0036 0.0055 0.0061* 0.0033
(1.16) (1.64) (1.77) (0.90)
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Cluster Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Observations 14,841 14,832 14,858 14,848
Adjusted R-Squared 0.306 0.324 0.323 0.378
Panel B - Abnormal Returns on Low Market Days
Table 4 - Downside Tail Risk Comovement in High and Low Cosine Groups
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cutoff = 5% Cutoff = 10% Cuttoff = 25% Cuttoff = 50%
Variable Prop. Low i,t,(HCG i,t-1) Prop. Low i,t,(HCG i,t-1) Prop. Low i,t,(HCG i,t-1) Prop. Low i,t,(HCG i,t-1)
Low Day i,t 0.0193*** 0.0216*** 0.0284*** 0.0340***
(3.82) (4.50) (5.74) (6.63)
High Cosine Group i,t-1 0.0018 0.0014 0.0005 -0.0001
(0.72) (0.57) (0.31) (-0.09)
High Cosine Group i,t-1 x Low Day i,t 0.0311*** 0.0256*** 0.0153*** 0.0079***
(9.08) (7.96) (6.78) (6.96)
Constant 0.0294*** 0.0311*** 0.0292*** 0.0306***
(19.67) (22.51) (34.16) (76.06)
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Cluster Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Observations 3,900,768 3,900,768 3,900,768 3,900,768
Adjusted R-squared 0.223 0.286 0.362 0.405
Overlap of Bank and Market Low Performance Days 
Table 5
This table presents the regression of the proportion of banks which have low performance on a given day on whether the given bank is also having a low
performance day. High/Low Cosine Group Cutoff Percentage (Cutoff) denotes the cutoff for high/low cosine similarity. For example 5% means that two banks
have high cosine similarity if their cosine similarity is above the 5th percentile of the cosine distribution.
Prop. Lowi,t,(HCG i,t-1) is the proportion of financial institutions in the group (HCG i,t) on day t which are having a low performance day (i.e. Low Day i,t = 1). Low
Dayi,t is an indicator variable set to 1 for financial institution i on day t if its daily abnormal return is in the bottom 5% of all of its daily returns. High Cosine
Groupi,t is a flag set to 1 if Prop. Low is calculated using banks in the high cosine group, 0 otherwise.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable LFM Days i,t LFM Days i,t LFM Days i,t LM AbnRet i,t LM AbnRet i,t LM AbnRet i,t
AvgCos_BUS i,t-1 2.7498*** 2.2387*** -0.0134*** -0.0114***
(5.95) (3.95) (-4.15) (-3.38)
AvgCos_MDA i,t-1 2.9445*** 1.1768*** -0.0137*** -0.0044***
(7.53) (2.87) (-5.15) (-2.64)
Size i,t-1 0.0096 0.0253 0.0013 0.0007** 0.0006* 0.0007**
(0.14) (0.37) (0.02) (2.07) (1.84) (2.04)
Beta i,t-1 0.2297 0.1141 0.2604 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003
(0.75) (0.40) (0.86) (-0.12) (0.13) (-0.16)
LFM Days i,t-1 0.3015*** 0.3047*** 0.3005***
(5.25) (5.44) (5.29)
LM AbnRet i,t-1 0.1816*** 0.1909*** 0.1817***
(2.79) (3.00) (2.82)
Constant 1.5920*** 1.2191** 1.1702** -0.0072** -0.0055* -0.0055*
(2.84) (2.35) (2.14) (-2.28) (-1.84) (-1.81)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year Year
Cluster Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Observations 7,918 8,366 7,770 7,750 8,184 7,602
Adjusted R-Squared 0.272 0.261 0.273 0.323 0.316 0.322
Table 6
Regression of Downside Tail Risk Comovement on the Average Cosine of the Business and MD&A Sections 
This table presents the regression of downside tail risk comovement on the average cosine of the Business Section (Item 1) and the MD&A Section
(Item 7) separately.
LFM Daysi,t is the number of days in year t where bank i and the banking market both have low performance. A low performance day is the lowest 20
days based upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the sum of the value weighted abnormal returns is used for the market). LM AbnReti,t the average
abnormal returns of bank i over days where the banking market has low performance. A low performance day is defined the same as above.
AvgCos_BUSi,t is the averager of the cosine similarity of the MD&A (Item 7) between financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in
year t-1. AvgCos_MDAi,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the Business Section (Item 1) between financial institution i and all other financial
institution filed in year t-1. Sizei,t is the log total assets for financial institution i in year t. Betai,t is market Beta for financial institution i in year t
measured using the market model and a rolling three year window of returns.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Variable LFM Days i,t LFM Days i,t LFM Days i,t LFM Days i,t LFM Days i,t LM AbnRet i,t LM AbnRet i,t LM AbnRet i,t LM AbnRet i,t LM AbnRet i,t
AvgCos_BUSMDA i,t-1 3.5912*** 5.1921*** 5.1413*** -0.0170*** -0.0189*** -0.0189***
(6.31) (5.88) (5.58) (-5.02) (-3.68) (-3.80)
AvgCos_Notes i,t-1 2.1539*** 0.4640 1.0882* -0.0112*** -0.0025 -0.0015
(3.52) (0.95) (1.88) (-4.42) (-1.26) (-0.52)
AvgCos_Risk i,t-1 2.0706*** -1.3437** -1.6566** -0.0212*** -0.0080** -0.0073**
(2.85) (-2.08) (-2.46) (-5.23) (-2.54) (-2.47)
Assets i,t-1 0.0506 0.0032 0.1833*** 0.1327* 0.1470* 0.0005* 0.0007** -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.80) (0.05) (2.58) (1.78) (1.95) (1.65) (2.44) (-0.83) (-0.42) (-0.57)
Beta i,t-1 0.0019 0.2403 0.3781* 0.6667*** 0.6771*** 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.01) (0.91) (1.66) (2.75) (2.80) (0.41) (-0.24) (-0.37) (-0.85) (-0.91)
LFM Days i,t-1 0.3084*** 0.2909*** 0.2056** 0.1638* 0.1476*
(5.86) (5.81) (2.09) (1.84) (1.76)
LM AbnRet i,t-1 0.1898*** 0.1630** 0.0343 0.0054 -0.0039
(2.76) (2.37) (0.73) (0.12) (-0.08)
Constant 0.9805 0.0909 0.0692 -0.7133 -1.6979 -0.0069*** -0.0032 0.0110** 0.0142** 0.0154***
(1.64) (0.14) (0.06) (-0.64) (-1.38) (-2.78) (-1.19) (2.15) (2.50) (2.67)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
Cluster Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Observations 7,797 7,652 3,366 3,309 3,067 7,622 7,478 3,275 3,218 2,979
Adjusted R-Squared 0.239 0.253 0.128 0.160 0.160 0.289 0.304 0.242 0.255 0.258
Table 7
Regression of Downside Tail Risk Comovement on Average Cosine Controlling for the Similarity of Other Sections of the 10-K
This table presents the regresison of downside tail risk comovement measures on the average cosine of the Business Section and MD&A of financial institutions controlling for the cosine similarity of the Notes to
the Finanical Statements and the Risk Factors section of the 10-K filing.
LFM Daysi,t is the number of days in year t where bank i and the banking market both have low performance. A low performance day is the lowest 20 days based upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the sum of
the value weighted abnormal returns is used for the market). LM AbnReti,t the average abnormal returns of bank i over days where the banking market has low performance. A low performance day is defined the
same as above. AvgCos_BUSMDAi,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the combined MD&A (Item 7) and Business Section (Item 1) between financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in
year t. AvgCos_Notesi,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the notes to the financial statements of firm i and all other financial institutions filed in year t. AvgCos_Risk i,t is the average of the cosine similarity of
the Risk Factors disclosure (Item 1a) of firm i and all other financial institutions filed in year t. Sizei,t is the log total assets for financial institution i in year t. Beta i,t is market Beta for financial institution i in year t
measured using the market model a rolling three year window of returns.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable LFM Days i,t LFM Days i,t LFM Days i,t LM AbnRet i,t LM AbnRet i,t LM AbnRet i,t
AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate i,t-1 3.1400*** 0.9101** -0.0147*** -0.0032**
(5.53) (2.22) (-4.19) (-1.99)
AvgCos_BUSMDA_NonBoilerplate i,t-1 3.7862*** 3.3968*** -0.0179*** -0.0166***
(7.12) (6.90) (-5.08) (-5.06)
Size i,t-1 0.0472 0.0027 0.0031 0.0005 0.0007** 0.0007**
(0.67) (0.04) (0.04) (1.56) (2.31) (2.20)
Beta i,t-1 0.0631 0.2495 0.2665 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.22) (0.86) (0.91) (0.23) (-0.20) (-0.23)
LFM Days i,t-1 0.3026*** 0.2922*** 0.2894***
(5.42) (5.35) (5.35)
LM AbnRet i,t-1 0.1836*** 0.1696*** 0.1621**
(2.86) (2.68) (2.55)
Constant 1.4633*** 0.7772 0.5700 -0.0067** -0.0035 -0.0027
(2.71) (1.34) (0.95) (-2.22) (-1.07) (-0.80)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year Year
Cluster Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year
Observations 8,317 8,367 8,166 8,136 8,187 7,988
Adjusted R-Squared 0.260 0.270 0.271 0.315 0.327 0.326
Table 8
Regression of Downrisk Tail Risk Comovement on the Average Cosine of Boilerplate and Non-Boilerplate Sentences
This table presents the regression of downside tail risk comovement on the average cosine of boilerplate and non-boilerplate disclosures.
LFM Daysi,t is the number of days in year t where bank i and the banking market both have low performance. A low performance day is the lowest 20 days based upon
daily abnormal returns in year t (the sum of the value weighted abnormal returns is used for the market). LM AbnReti,t the average abnormal returns of bank i over days
where the banking market has low performance. A low performance day is defined the same as above. AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate(NonBoilerplate) i,t is the average of
the cosine similarity of the boilerplate (nonboilerplate) sentences in the combined MD&A (Item 7) and Business Section (Item 1) between financial institution i and all
other financial institutions filed in year t-1. Sizei, t is the log of total assets for financial institution i in year t. Beta i,t is market Beta for financial institution i in year t
measured using the market model and a rolling three year window of returns.
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(1) (2)
Variable LFM Days i,t LM AbnRet i,t
AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate i,t-1 0.2047 -0.0016
(0.30) (-0.72)
AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate i,t-2 -0.1727 0.0025
(-0.21) (0.85)
AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate i,t-3 1.4300** -0.0057**
(2.07) (-2.17)
AvgCos_BUSMDA_NonBoilerplate i,t-1 2.0156*** -0.0080**
(2.87) (-2.21)
AvgCos_BUSMDA_NonBoilerplate i,t-2 2.3596*** -0.0042
(2.69) (-0.95)
AvgCos_BUSMDA_NonBoilerplate i,t-3 -1.0776 -0.0043
(-1.41) (-1.20)
Size i,t-1 0.0289 0.0005
(0.33) (1.25)
Beta i,t-1 0.3077 -0.0007
(1.06) (-0.33)
LFM Days i,t-1 0.2987***
(4.95)
LM AbnRet i,t-1 0.1657**
(2.32)
Constant 0.7284 -0.0064
(0.80) (-1.34)
Fixed Effects Year Year
Cluster Firm & Year Firm & Year
Observations 5,247 5,139
Adjusted R-Squared 0.267 0.321
Table 9
Regression of Downside Tail Risk Comovement on the Average Cosine of Boilerplate and Non-
Boilerplate with Lags
This table presents the regression of downside tail risk comovement measures on the average cosine of
boilerplate and non-boilerplate disclosures with lags.
LFM Daysi,t is the number of days in year t where bank i and the banking market both have low performance.
A low performance day is the lowest 20 days based upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the sum of the value
weighted abnormal returns is used for the market). LM AbnReti,t the average abnormal returns of bank i over
days where the banking market has low performance. A low performance day is defined the same as above.
AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate(NonBoilerplate) i,t is the average of the cosine similarity of the boilerplate
(nonboilerplate) sentences in the combined MD&A (Item 7) and Business Section (Item 1) between financial
institution i and all other financial institutions filed in year t-1. Sizei,t is the log of total assets for financial
institution i in year t. Betai,t is market Beta for financial institution i in year t measured using the market model
and a rolling three year window of returns.
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(1) (2)
Variable LFM Days i,t LM AbnRet i,t
AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate i,t-1 1.4814*** -0.0039*
(2.81) (-1.75)
AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate i,t-1 x Post-2006 t -1.0108 0.0015
(-1.36) (0.49)
AvgCos_BUSMDA_NonBoilerplate i,t-1 2.0053*** -0.0092***
(3.77) (-4.06)
AvgCos_BUSMDA_NonBoilerplate i,t-1 x Post-2006 t 2.2273*** -0.0125***
(2.58) (-2.73)
Size i,t-1 -0.0064 0.0010**
(-0.07) (2.41)
Beta i,t-1 -1.1406*** 0.0054*
(-2.74) (1.89)
LFM Days i,t-1 0.2596***
(6.27)
LM AbnRet i,t-1 0.1745***
(2.72)
Constant 1.9054*** 0.0120**
(3.77) (2.01)
Fixed Effects Year Year
Cluster Firm & Year Firm & Year
Observations 8,166 7,988
Adjusted R-Squared 0.301 0.370
Table 10
Regression of Downside Tail Risk Comovement on Boilerplate and Non-Boilerplate Post 2006
This table presents the regression of downside tail risk comovement measures on the average cosine of boilerplate and non-
boilerplate disclosures interacted with an indicator variable for post-2006.
LFM Daysi,t is the number of days in year t where bank i and the banking market both have low performance. A low
performance day is the lowest 20 days based upon daily abnormal returns in year t (the sum of the value weighted abnormal
returns is used for the market). LM AbnReti,t the average abnormal returns of bank i over days where the banking market has
low performance. A low performance day is defined the same as above. AvgCos_BUSMDA_Boilerplate (NonBoilerplate)i, t is
the average of the cosine similarity of the boilerplate (nonboilerplate) sentences in the combined MD&A (Item 7) and Business
Section (Item 1) between financial institution i and all other financial institutions filed in year t-1. Size i,t is the log of total assets
for financial institution i in year t. Betai,t is market Beta for financial institution i in year t measured using the market model and
a rolling three year window of returns. Post-2006t is an indicator variable set to 1 if the year is greater than or equal to 2006, 0
otherwise. Interactions between all control variables and the post-2006 indicator are included.
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